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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CORRECTION OFFICER BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION 
OF ROCKLAND COUNTY, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17366 
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND AND SHERIFF OF 
ROCKLAND COUNTY, 
Respondent. 
600DSTEIN & WEST (NANCY ZECCA of counsel), for Charging 
Party 
JOSEPH E. SUAREZ, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us now on a request made by the County of 
Rockland and the Sheriff of Rockland County (County) to appeal a 
ruling by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reopening this 
charge, which had been closed administratively. The Correction 
Officer Benevolent Association of Rockland County (COBA) alleges 
in this charge that the County refused to negotiate a decision to 
double cell inmates and the impact thereof. As a result of the 
reopening, the case is now pending for decision by the ALJ. 
An interlocutory appeal from a ruling made in conjunction 
with the processing of a case is by permission only under 
§204.7(h)(2) of our Rules of Procedure. In Town of 
Shawangunk,^ we denied a respondent's request for permission to 
^29 PERB 53050 (1996). 
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This case comes to us now on a request made by the County of 
Rockland and the Sheriff of Rockland County (County) to appeal a 
ruling by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reopening this 
charge, which had been closed administratively. The Correction 
Officer Benevolent Association of Rockland County (COBA) alleges 
in this charge that the County refused to negotiate a decision to 
double cell inmates and the impact thereof. As a result of the 
reopening, the case is now pending for decision by the ALT. 
An interlocutory appeal from a ruling made in conjunction 
with the processing of a case is by permission only under 
§204.7(h)(2) of our Rules of Procedure. In Town of 
Shawangunk,-7 we denied a respondent's request for permission to 
/ J/29 PERB fl3050 (1996) . 
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appeal a ruling reopening a closed case. In Town of Shawanaunk, 
a hearing had not yet been held and the reopening of the charge 
exposed the respondent to the time and expense of a hearing, 
which the respondent argued could be avoided if its interlocutory 
appeal were heard and granted. This case, in contrast, has been 
litigated, with only the ALJ's decision to issue. There is, 
therefore, even less reason to grant the County permission to 
appeal than there was in Town of Shawancrunk. The extraordinary 
circumstances necessary to our grant of permission to appeal from 
an interlocutory ruling not being present, the County's request 
to appeal is denied, without prejudice to its right to appeal the 
ruling reopening the charge upon exceptions, if any, to the ALJ's 
decision. Because the issue of whether the charge was properly 
reopened is preserved for eventual appeal by the County as it 
deems necessary and appropriate, its interests are fully 
protected and permission for interlocutory appeal is not 
warranted. 
For the reasons set forth above, the County's request to 
appeal from the ALJ's ruling reopening this charge is denied. SO 
ORDERED. , 
DATED: November 4, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Pa'ulirne R. KirisellaV Chairperson 
/Marc A. Abbottr; Member 
• > 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ERIE COUNTY SHERIFF'S POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-18374 
COUNTY OF ERIE AND ERIE COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Respondent. 
W. JAMES SCHWAN, ESQ., for Charging Party 
MICHAEL A. CONNORS, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of 
Erie and Erie County Sheriff (County) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed by the Erie 
County Sheriff's Police Benevolent Association (PBA). As 
relevant to these exceptions,-7 the PBA alleges that the County 
violated §209-a.l(a) by failing and refusing to remit membership 
dues and agency shop fees to it. 
J 
^The charge as filed alleged violations of §209-a.l(a), (c) , (d) 
and (e) of the Act. The ALJ dismissed all but the §209-a.l(a) 
allegation and no exceptions have been taken as to the ALJ's 
dismissal of the other aspects of the charge. 
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The PBA was certified to represent a unit of full-time 
deputy sheriffs-criminal on October 23, 1996.^ Deputy sheriffs-
criminal had been in an overall Sheriff's department unit 
represented by Teamsters Local 264. Pursuant to a representation 
petition filed by the PBA, by decision dated June 19, 1996, we 
fragmented the existing Sheriff's department unit and found most 
appropriate the deputy sheriff-criminal unit-7 for which the PBA 
was certified. After the PBA's certification, the County 
commenced a judicial proceeding seeking to annul our decision and 
order creating the separate deputy sheriff-criminal unit. That 
proceeding is now pending before the Appellate Division, Third 
Department. 
This charge was filed on November 12, 1996. On November 21, 
1996, the PBA also commenced a proceeding pursuant to Article 78 
of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) seeking to 
compel the County to remit to it the membership dues and agency 
shop fees from the employees in the deputy sheriff-criminal unit. 
By decision dated December 7, 1996, and order dated March 7, 
1997, Supreme Court, Erie County, ordered the County to escrow 
the dues and fees from the employees in the deputy sheriff-
criminal unit which had been deducted since October 23, 1996. 
The Court also referred all questions concerning the rights and 
g/County of Erie and Sheriff of Erie County, 29 PERB 5[3000.31 
(1996). 
^County of Erie and Sheriff of Erie County, 29 PERB 5[3031 
(1996). 
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duties of the parties with respect to the at-issue dues and fees 
to Supreme Court, Albany County, which was then presiding over 
the County's CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking to annul our 
uniting determination. There has been no appeal from Supreme 
Court's escrow and referral decision and order. 
The ALJ found the County in violation of §209-a.l(a) of the 
Act. The ALJ held that the County's appeal from our uniting 
decision did not automatically stay our decision and 
certification order pursuant to CPLR 5519 because CPLR 5519 
applies only to appeals from civil judicial judgments or 
orders,-7 not decisions and orders of an administrative agency. 
Finding no stay,-7 the ALJ then held that the PBA was entitled 
under the Act to the deduction and transmittal of membership dues 
and agency shop fees from the employees in the deputy sheriff-
criminal unit for which it had been certified as the exclusive 
bargaining agent. The ALJ further held that Supreme Court's 
order escrowing the dues and fees had expired with her 
determination declaring PBA's rights to the dues and fees. In 
that regard, the ALJ concluded that it was the Court's intent 
that the escrow would expire when the rights of the PBA were 
declared by anyone with authority to decide the issue, which 
-
7The CPLR applies by its terms only to "civil judicial 
proceedings in . . . courts of the state . . . ." CPLR 101. 
-
7A discretionary stay of enforcement of an administrative 
determination being reviewed can be sought under CPLR 7805, but 
there is no evidence that a stay pursuant to that provision of 
the CPLR was sought or obtained. 
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included either a court pursuant to the referral or PERB pursuant 
to this charge. 
The County argues that the ALJ erred in holding that its 
appeal of our uniting determination did not stay the PBA's 
certification and that the ALJ exceeded her authority by 
determining that the Court's escrow order had expired. The PBA 
has not responded to the County's exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that we should not 
exercise jurisdiction over this charge and that it should be 
conditionally dismissed without reaching the merits of PBA's 
allegations, subject to a motion to reopen in appropriate 
circumstances. 
The PBA is simultaneously seeking to obtain the County's 
checkoff of dues and agency shop fees in two different forums. 
The CPLR Article 78 proceeding which the PBA commenced against 
the County resulted in a judicial decision and order escrowing 
the at-issue dues and fees before the ALJ decided this case. That 
proceeding is still pending for determination either at Supreme 
Court, Albany County, or the Appellate Division, Third 
Department, pursuant to the transfer of the County's CPLR 
Article 78 proceeding appealing the Board's uniting decision. 
We have previously indicated our willingness to refrain from 
an exercise of our improper practice jurisdiction in 
circumstances in which the charging party has initiated a 
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judicial proceeding involving the same or similar issues.-7 The 
PBA alleges in both the administrative and the judicial contexts 
that it has the right under the Act to the receipt of dues and 
fees from the deputy sheriffs-criminal in its unit 
notwithstanding the County's appeal of our uniting determination. 
The relief it seeks in both forums is the same. It would not 
effectuate the policies of the Act to allow the PBA to maintain 
essentially the same cause of action in two places 
simultaneously. 
Declination of jurisdiction in these circumstances serves 
several purposes without prejudice to PBA's rights. First, it 
avoids our having to make an interpretation of the Court's escrow 
order and any unexpressed "intent" underlying that order. 
Second, it prevents an improper practice proceeding from becoming 
an unofficial mechanism to appeal and reverse a prior judicial 
determination. The process for appeal from judicial judgments 
and orders is set forth in the CPLR which, so far as practicable, 
should be the exclusive means by which an aggrieved party may 
seek review. Third, declination of jurisdiction avoids the 
possibility of inconsistent results and the untenable positions 
into which these parties would be cast. If the County complies 
with the ALJ's order and remits the escrowed funds to the PBA on 
the theory that the Court's escrow order has "expired", it risks 
being in contempt of the Court's order. That circumstance is 
^Elwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 6 PERB f3039 (1973) (subsequent 
history omitted). 
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obviously further complicated if the County prevails in its 
appeal of our uniting decision such that Teamsters Local 264 
remains the bargaining agent for an overall Sheriff's department 
unit. On the other hand, if the County were to comply with the 
Court's order, it risks noncompliance with any administrative 
order issued pursuant to a finding of violation of the Act. 
Although a dismissal of this charge on the merits would, of 
course, avoid the several policy issues stated as reasons for 
declining jurisdiction, a dismissal rendered in the circumstances 
of this case might be viewed as one not on the merits of the 
charge, but one reached only to avoid consideration of the policy 
issues previously mentioned. Any perception that the disposition 
of a charge has been reached on other than the merits is itself a 
consequence to be avoided if possible and serves as an additional 
reason for us to decline to exercise jurisdiction at this time. 
Our declination to exercise jurisdiction over this charge is 
also not prejudicial to the PBA's interests. Disposition of the 
County's appeal of our uniting determination will likely resolve 
any issues regarding the PBA's rights under the Act to checkoff 
of dues and fees from the deputy sheriffs-criminal.-7 If and to 
the extent that litigation does not fully resolve those issues, 
-'We are not suggesting by our observation of this likelihood 
that the County's appeal from our uniting determination would 
have been grounds for a declination of jurisdiction if the PBA 
had not commenced and had pending its own judicial proceeding 
seeking the deduction and transmittal to it of the at-issue dues 
and fees. Our point is only that there are at least two other 
proceedings pending which will likely resolve the issues raised 
by this charge. 
Board - U-18374 
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the PBA's Article 78 proceeding against the County, which is 
still pending, will do so. In the unlikely event that neither 
the County's nor the PBA's Article 78 proceeding fully resolves 
the issues concerning the parties' rights and duties regarding 
the deduction and transmittal of membership dues and agency shop 
fees, the PBA may move to reopen this charge. 
For the reasons set forth above, the charge is dismissed 
without prejudice to PBA's right to reopen under such 
circumstances as may be appropriate. Given our disposition, we 
do not decide the effect, if any, of the County's appeal of our 
uniting determination upon our certification of the PBA as the 
exclusive negotiating agent for the unit of deputy sheriffs-
criminal. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 4, 1997 
Albany, New York 
M-
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HOLBROOK FIRE DISTRICT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NOS. U-17643 & 
U-17755 
HOLBROOK FIRE DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
MICHAEL KRAUTHAMER, ESQ., for Charging Party 
INGERMAN SMITH, L.L.P. (JOHN H. GROSS Of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the Holbrook 
Fire District (District) to a decision by an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) on two charges filed by the Holbrook Fire District 
Association (Association). The first charge (U-17643) alleges 
that the District violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it issued Jason 
Feinberg, a fire dispatcher for the District, a counseling 
memorandum dated February 27, 1996 because he was then attempting 
to organize District employees into a union for purposes of 
collective bargaining with the District. The second charge 
alleges that the District also violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of 
the Act when, on March 26, 1996, for the same improper reason, it 
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rescheduled Feinberg from the midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift to the 
4:00 p.m. to midnight shift. 
After a hearing, the ALJ held that the District violated 
the Act as alleged. The ALJ concluded, largely on credibility 
resolutions favorable to the Association, that Feinberg was 
engaged in activities protected by the Act, that District agents, 
including Deborah Knopfke, the District Manager who took the at-
issue personnel actions, knew about Feinberg's protected 
activities, and that the personnel actions were taken because of 
those activities. 
The District argues in its exceptions that Feinberg was not 
engaged in any statutorily protected activities on the dates the 
acts complained of in the charges occurred and that it did not 
know Feinberg was engaged in any union-related activities until 
after the personnel actions at issue were taken. In these 
regards, the District argues that it knew at the relevant times 
only that Feinberg and another District fire dispatcher, David 
Beattie, had attended a meeting with the Board of Fire 
Commissioners and Knopfke on February 15, 1996, which the 
District argues was not protected activity under the Court of 
Appeals decision in Rosen v. PERB.^ The District argues also 
that it took both personnel actions for legitimate business 
reasons• 
1772 N.Y.2d 42, 21 PERB 57014 (1998). 
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The Association, in response to the District's exceptions 
argues that the ALJ's findings of fact and his conclusions of law 
are correct, and that his decision should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and having considered the 
parties' arguments, including those at oral argument, we affirm 
the ALJ's decision. 
In affirming the ALJ's decision, we find it unnecessary to 
decide whether Feinberg's appearance at the meeting on 
February 15, 1996 itself constituted activity protected by the 
Act. The record establishes, without contradiction, that after 
that meeting, between February 22 and 24, 1996, Feinberg met with 
approximately fifteen District employees, discussed the benefits 
of having a union with them, and distributed union authorization 
cards which were signed by eleven employees. Those activities 
are clearly protected by the Act. The question becomes, 
therefore, whether the two personnel actions which the District 
took against Feinberg thereafter were taken because of those 
organizing activities or, as the District argues, for entirely 
legitimate reasons in the ordinary course of its business without 
knowledge of Feinberg's protected activities. 
Feinberg's counseling memorandum was dated February 27, 
1996. The ALJ found that Knopfke knew by that date that Feinberg 
was engaged in efforts to form a union from his statements and 
actions at the meeting with the Fire Commissioners and Knopfke on 
February 15 and from the small size of the District in which 
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Knopfke is the employees' immediate supervisor.-7 Even if the 
February 15 meeting was not itself protected activity, that 
meeting is properly considered to evidence the District's 
knowledge regarding Feinberg7s subsequent organizing activities. 
The basis for the ALJ's findings regarding the District's 
knowledge about Feinberg's organizing efforts have clear support 
in the record and are properly affirmed. It was reasonable and 
consistent with the record for the ALJ to have found that the 
District had to have known, or at least had to have believed, 
that Feinberg was pursuing organizing efforts after the February 
15 meeting he and Beattie had with the Fire Commissioners and 
Knopfke. Feinberg and Beattie requested that meeting. Feinberg 
made it known to the Commissioners and Knopfke that employees 
wanted issues concerning their terms and conditions of employment 
addressed. Interest in a written agreement was expressed and 
copies of collective bargaining agreements other unions had with 
other fire districts were shown to the District's Commissioners. 
Feinberg and Beattie left that meeting with their demands 
completely unmet. They were told that employees were being paid 
what they deserved given that their jobs were not "career jobs", 
that maybe the District would consider "in a year" some dental 
coverage, and that if the employees wanted to seek employment 
elsewhere, the District xvould encourage the employees to do so. 
-''The District at the relevant dates had approximately 2 0 
employees. 
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The ALT specifically discredited Knopfke's assertion that 
she did not know about any unionization efforts by Feinberg or 
other employees until a February 26, 1996 letter demanding 
recognition was received by her sometime in the beginning of 
March 1996.-f It was wholly reasonable for the ALJ to have 
concluded upon this record, with the credibility resolutions he 
made, that Knopfke knew or at least believed that Feinberg was 
then or would soon be organizing employees to try to obtain 
formally through a labor organization what had been denied the 
employees informally at the meeting on February 15. 
The shift change which the ALJ found to have violated the 
Act was one announced in late March 1996, to take effect mid-
April 1996. Although the District suggests that this shift 
change was planned and effectively made on February 23, 1996, 
when Feinberg was assigned to an 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. shift, 
the March shift change, which was effective in April, assigned 
him to a 4:00 p.m. to midnight shift.-* Nothing in this record 
would require or warrant a conclusion that Feinberg's assignment 
to the 4:00 p.m. to midnight shift was a decision made any time 
before March 1996. By then, not only had Feinberg engaged in the 
protected organizing activities previously mentioned, but a 
-
;The record shows conclusively that the letter was actually 
received before March 199 6 because Knopfke denied the 
Association's demand for recognition by letter dated February 29, 
1996. The record does not establish, however, the exact date 
upon which Knopfke received the demand for recognition. 
-
7That shift change prevented Feinberg from working one or more 
part-time jobs he had with other fire districts. 
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formal demand for the Association's recognition had been made, 
Feinberg had been identified as one of the Association's 
organizing team, the recognition demanded had been rejected by 
Knopfke, and a petition for certification had been filed by the 
Association.-7 Therefore, the late March shift change was made 
unquestionably with the District's actual knowledge of Feinberg's 
protected activities. 
The only remaining issue is the motive for the District's 
counseling memorandum and the at-issue shift change. In that 
regard, the ALJ considered at length the District's articulated 
business rationale, and he held, upon credibility resolutions, 
that the District's stated reasons for its actions were 
pretextual and that the real reason for both personnel actions 
was Feinberg's protected activities. Those findings, fully 
explained in the ALJ's decision, are supported by the record, 
which affords us no basis for reversal. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed and the District's exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Rescind the counseling memorandum dated February 27, 
1996 issued to Jason Feinberg and remove that 
-''The Association subsequently withdrew its petition and another 
union filed a petition seeking to represent the same employees, 
who have voted against representation. That second petition was 
dismissed pursuant to the employees' vote. Holbrook Fire Dist., 
30 PERB 13035 (1997) . 
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memorandum from his personnel or other employment 
files. 
2. Immediately reassign Jason Feinberg to the midnight to 
8:00 a.m. shift and maintain that shift assignment in 
accordance with District policy and practice. 
3. Make Jason Feinberg whole for any wages and benefits 
lost as a result of his reassignment from the midnight 
to 8:00 a.m. shift in March 1996 with interest at the 
currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
4. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
customarily used to post notices of information to 
District employees. 
DATED: November 4, 1997 
Albany, New York 
pfWt— TCC\/viiL^ 
PaulMie R. Kinse l la ' , Chai rperson 
Marc A. Abbot t , Member 

NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Holbrook Fire District (District) that the District will: 
1. Rescind the counseling memorandum dated February 27, 1996 issued to Jason Feinberg and remove that 
memorandum from his personnel or other employment files. 
2. Immediately reassign Jason Feinberg to the midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift and maintain that shift assignment 
in accordance with District policy and practice. 
3. Make Jason Feinberg whole for any wages and benefits lost as a result of his reassignment from the midnight 
to 8:00 a.m. shift in March 1996 with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
HOLBROOK FIRE DISTRICT 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
KEVIN SIMMONS, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-18899 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY and 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION LOCAL 100, 
AFL-CIO, 
Respondents. 
CURTIS HARGER, ESQ., for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Kevin Simmons 
to a decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing his charge that the New York 
City Transit Authority (Authority) and the Transport Workers 
Union Local 100, AFL-CIO (TWU) violated, respectively, §209-
a.l(a) and §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act). Simmons alleges that the Authority and the TWU 
conspired to have him terminated from his employment with the 
Authority. Simmons was notified that the charge as filed was 
deficient. He then filed an amendment, but that failed to 
correct the deficiencies and the charge was thereafter dismissed. 
Most of the allegations were dismissed as untimely. The 
remaining allegations were dismissed as failing to set forth 
facts which would establish a violation of the Act. 
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Simmons excepts to the Director's decision, arguing that the 
allegations in the amended charge, even though untimely, 
established the improper motivation necessary to find that the 
timely allegations set forth a violation of the Act. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the 
arguments raised, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
Simmons was employed as a bus operator until his dismissal 
was confirmed by a tripartite arbitration board on December 31, 
1996. Simmons was charged with submitting fraudulent doctor's 
notes in support of days he had taken off from work and charged 
to sick leave. In his charge, Simmons claims that 
representatives of the Authority and the TWU knew he had not seen 
a doctor while he was out of work and conspired to force him to 
obtain fraudulent medical excuses so that they could then 
terminate him. The arbitration board found that Simmons had been 
on a Sick Leave Control List-' since November 15, 1995. He was, 
therefore, required to provide documentation for every sick leave 
absence while he was on the list. Failure to provide such 
documentation results in denial of sick leave pay and appropriate 
disciplinary action. 
Simmons was out on sick leave from August 31, 1996 to 
September 3, 1996. On September 16, 1996, Anthony Crisci, 
General Superintendent Transportation, and John Mauri, TWU 
representative, met with Simmons. He was advised by Crisci that 
^Employees who have six or more unsubstantiated sick leave 
absences within a 12-month period are placed on the list. 
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because he was on the Sick Leave Control List, he had to submit a 
doctor's certification for the days he had charged to sick leave 
or he would receive a ten-day suspension. Simmons accepted the 
extension of time to obtain a doctor's note to cover his absence. 
Later that day, Simmons submitted a doctor's certification, dated 
September 9, 1996, in support of his absences from August 31 to 
September 4, 1996. Thereafter, Michael McFarland, a Special 
Investigator for the Authority, investigated Simmons' sick leave 
application because the date on the doctor's certification and 
the date the application was submitted were so much later than 
the days of absence. McFarland interviewed the doctor whose 
signature appeared on the certification and the doctor denied 
signing the certification or ever treating Simmons. Crisci was 
notified of the apparent fraud and he then met with Simmons and 
Mauri. Crisci urged Simmons to resign and told Simmons that if 
he did not resign, he would be suspended for thirty days and 
disciplinary charges seeking his termination would be filed. 
Mauri also tried to persuade Simmons to resign. Simmons refused, 
claiming that if Crisci and Mauri had not urged him to get a 
doctor's certification, so as to avoid the ten-day suspension for 
his unsubstantiated use of sick leave in August and September 
1996, when they knew he had not seen a doctor while he was absent 
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from work, he would not have obtained the fraudulent doctor's 
certification. -y 
Simmons made the same claim at his arbitration hearing on 
December 31, 1996, arguing that Crisci and Mauri must have known 
that he would have to commit fraud to obtain a doctor's 
certification because they knew that he had not seen a doctor 
while he was out from August 31 to September 3, 1996. The 
arbitration board found him guilty of fraud and sustained the 
disciplinary charge and penalty of dismissal on December 31, 
1996. This charge was filed on April 15, 1997. 
The Director correctly determined that any allegations 
relating to events occurring before December 15, 1996, were 
untimely, having occurred more than four months prior to the 
filing of the charge.-7 With regard to the conduct of the 
arbitration hearing on December 31, 1996, the charge fails to set 
forth any violation of the Act by either the Authority or TWU. 
As to the Authority, there are no facts alleged in either 
the original charge or the amended charge to evidence or 
establish that any adverse employment action was taken against 
him by the Authority because of his exercise of rights protected 
by the Act. 
^Apparently Simmons went to a doctor's office and paid $20 to a 
receptionist who gave him a signed doctor's certification for the 
dates he was absent from work. 
5/Rules of Procedure, §204.1(a) (1) . 
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As to the TWU, the Director correctly found on Simmons' own 
allegations that the TWU had represented Simmons throughout the 
disciplinary proceedings, advising him and presenting his case at 
the arbitration. That Simmons disagrees with the way in which 
the case was handled by the TWU representatives-7 does not 
establish that the TWU was arbitrary, discriminatory or acted in 
bad faith in its conduct of the arbitration hearing.-7 Even 
after Simmons admitted that he had purchased a doctor's 
certificate, the TWU continued to represent him. There are no 
facts alleged in the charge or its amendment which would 
establish, if proven, a violation of the duty of fair 
representation. 
Based on the foregoing, the exceptions are dismissed and the 
decision of the Director is affirmed. 
-
7Simmons asserts that the TWU failed to keep out of evidence a 
version of the disciplinary charge which alleged a course of 
conduct of obtaining fraudulent medical documentation from the 
same doctor's office on earlier occasions, but his pleadings show 
that the TWU did object, albeit unsuccessfully, to the 
presentation of the document. In any event, the arbitrator's 
decision relies only on one instance of submission of fraudulent 
medical documentation for its termination order. Simmons also 
claims that the TWU could have called Mauri to corroborate his 
testimony that Crisci told him to get a doctor's certificate. A 
representative is entitled to some leeway in the presentation of 
its case. Here, Simmons had admitted to the panel that he had 
purchased the doctor's certificate and that was the basis upon 
which the panel sustained the disciplinary charge. Even Simmons 
concedes that Mauri's testimony would only have established that 
Crisci told Simmons that if he did not have a doctor's 
certificate, he would be suspended for ten days without pay. 
-
7Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Diaz. 132 A.D.2d 430, 20 PERB 
57024 (3d Dep't 1987), aff'd on other grounds. 73 N.Y.2d 796, 21 
PERB 57017 (1988). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 4, 1997 
Albany, New York 
fycyl:^ Zk*i\<*4_L. 
Pauline R. Mns^lia, Chairperson 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
CASE NOS. E-2025 
and E-2026 
ROBERT P. MERINO, JR., CORPORATION COUNSEL (RICHARD J. 
ROTELLA of counsel), for Employer 
E. JOSEPH 6IR0UX, JR., ESQ., for Intervenor United 
Steelworkers of America, Local 15071 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by both the City 
of Niagara Falls (City) and the United Steelworkers of America, 
Local 15071 (Steelworkers) to a decision of the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director). The 
City excepts to the Director's denial of the City's application 
to designate James Sorge, Systems Manager, and Dean Spring, City 
Purchasing Agent, as managerial in accordance with the criteria 
set forth in §201.7(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) Af (Case No. E-2025). The Steelworkers except to the 
1/ Section 201.7(a) defines the term "public employee" as "any 
person holding a position by appointment or employment in 
the service of a public employer, except that such term 
shall not include for the purposes of any provision of this 
article other than sections two hundred ten and two hundred 
eleven of this article,...persons...who may reasonably be 
designated from time to time as managerial or confidential 
(Footnote cont'd on next page.) 
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designation of Anita Zona, Secretary to the Director of Human 
Resources, and Roberta Mackie, Junior Human Resources Technician, 
as confidential within the meaning of the Act (Case No. E-2 026). 
The Director determined that neither Sorge nor Spring was 
managerial because neither formulated policy and neither could 
reasonably be expected, based on their job descriptions, to 
perform labor relations or contract administration duties. 
However, the Director found that Zona and Mackie performed duties 
of a confidential nature for the City's Director of Human 
Resources, David Fabrizio, who is responsible for the City's 
labor relations and who is the chief negotiator for the City with 
its eight bargaining units. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of 
the parties' arguments, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, 
the decision of the Director. 
(Footnote 1 cont'd.) 
upon application of the public employer to the 
appropriate board....Employees may be designated as 
managerial only if they are persons (i) who formulate 
policy or (ii) who may reasonably be required on behalf 
of the public employer to assist directly in the 
preparation for and conduct of collective negotiations 
or to have a major role in the administration of 
agreements or in personnel administration provided that 
such role is not of a routine or clerical nature and 
requires the exercise of independent judgment. 
Employees may be designated as confidential only if 
they are persons who assist and act in a confidential 
capacity to managerial employees described in clause 
(ii)." 
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Fabrizio testified that both Sorge and Spring attend monthly 
department head meetings.-7 At these meetings, the City 
Administrator, Fabrizio, Spring and Sorge, as well as the City's 
other department heads,-7 discuss ongoing and future City 
programs, budget preparation, cost reduction measures and 
negotiations. 
The Director dismissed the application as to Sorge and 
Spring upon the ground that they did not formulate policy, but 
acted only as resource persons during these meetings.-7 
However, Fabrizio also testified that prior to negotiations the 
City's proposals are discussed and modified, the City's bottom 
line is reviewed and negotiations strategies are outlined at the 
department head meetings. Fabrizio could not attribute any 
specific comments to Sorge or Spring, but he testified that they 
had been present for and had participated in the discussions 
about negotiations and the City's proposed privatization of its 
-
7Sorge heads the City's Management Information Systems (MIS) and 
supervises a staff of seven. Spring is responsible for the 
City's central purchasing system, record management, assets 
inventory and telephone system. 
-
7The Manager of Environmental Services, Director of Building 
Inspection, Fire Chief, Police Superintendent, City Engineer, 
City Controller, Corporation Counsel, Director of the Department 
of Public Works/Parks and Director of Utilities are the other 
department heads who attend the monthly meetings. None are in a 
bargaining unit. 
-
7The Director also found that although the job descriptions of 
both Sorge and Spring had recently been amended to include 
negotiations and grievance responsibilities, the City had offered 
no evidence that either could be "reasonably required" to perform 
such duties. The application Was dismissed on that ground also. 
See City of Jamestown. 19 PERB f3019 (1986). 
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sanitation services. While both Sorge and Spring testified that 
they had not made any negotiations proposals, they both agreed 
that they had been present at department head meetings where 
negotiation strategies and proposals had been discussed. 
It is clear that both Sorge and Spring are exposed to the 
City's negotiation proposals in their formative stages, before 
the proposals have been finalized and presented to the several 
City unions. They are privy to and may participate in 
discussions in which the City's negotiations strategy is 
formulated and its proposals are finalized, including the City's 
bottom line in negotiations. For this reason alone, both warrant 
managerial designation.-7 Because of our finding, we do not 
reach the City's other exceptions to the Director's decision 
concerning these positions. 
Both Zona and Mackie work for Fabrizio, who is responsible 
for all of the City's labor relations, including contract 
negotiations, contract administration, grievances and 
disciplinary actions. Zona, as Fabrizio's secretary, types all 
of his correspondence and memoranda relating to contract 
negotiations, grievances, disciplinary proceedings and 
arbitrations, and she has access to all the material in his 
files. She is a confidential employee.-7 Mackie has access to 
retirement applications, workers' compensation and civil service 
S/Citv of Bincrhamton, 12 PERB 14022, aff'd, 12 PERB J[3099 (1979). 
^Id. 
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information of all the City's employees. However, it is her role . 
in substituting for Zona, which she has done for several months 
while Zona was on leave, that warrants her designation as 
confidential. Mackie has performed all of Zona's duties in her 
absence, including typing draft grievance responses and draft 
negotiation proposals. For this reason, her designation as 
confidential is warranted. 
For the reasons set forth above, the City's exceptions to 
the Director's decision are granted and the Steelworker's 
exceptions are denied. The Director's decision in Case No. 
E-2025 is reversed and we find that Sorge and Spring are, and 
they are hereby designated, managerial employees within the 
meaning of the Act. The Director's decision in Case No. E-2026, 
designating Zona and Mackie as confidential, is affirmed. 
DATED: November 4, 1997 
Albany, New York ^ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
''Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RENSSELAER COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S 
P.B.A., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4663 
COUNTY OF RENSSELAER and SHERIFF OF 
RENSSELAER COUNTY, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. 
Intervenor. 
BOHL, DELLAROCCA & DORFMAN, P.C. (JAMES B. TUTTLE of 
counsel), for Petitioner 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (TIMOTHY CONNICK of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Rensselaer 
County Deputy Sheriff's P.B.A. (PBA) to a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) dismissing as untimely a petition seeking to represent 
certain deputy sheriffs of the County of Rensselaer and Sheriff 
of Rensselaer County (County) who are currently in a unit 
represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). 
CSEA and the County entered into a five-year contract in 
November 1994, covering January 1, 1994 through December 31, 
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1998. Applying our decisions in County of Orange and Sheriff of 
Orange County-7 (hereafter Orange) and Kenmore-Town of Tonawanda 
Union Free School District-7 (hereafter Kenmore-Tonawanda), the 
Director held that the five-year contract had to be treated as 
two contracts for purposes of fixing challenge periods, one 
contract expiring in November 1997 and one expiring in December 
1998. On that basis, the Director held that CSEA was open to 
challenge in May 1996 and again in May 1998, but not in May 1997, 
when the PBA filed this petition. 
The PBA argues in its exceptions that a literal reading of 
§208.2-7 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) and 
§201.3 (e)-7 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) makes CSEA open to 
challenge continuously on and after May 1, 1997. According to 
the PBA, Orange and Kenmore-Tonawanda, which it admits endorse 
the "successive contract methodology relied on by the Director," 
should be limited to their particular facts and disregarded in 
I727 PERB 53068 (1994) . 
2712 PERB 5[3055 (1979) . 
-
7In relevant part, §208.2(b) of the Act provides that an 
"agreement having a term in excess of three years shall be 
treated as an agreement for a term of three years . . . ." 
-
7This section of the Rules allows petitions to be filed "120 
days subsequent to the expiration of a written agreement . . . 
or, if the agreement does not expire at the end of the employer's 
fiscal year, then 12 0 days subsequent to the end of the fiscal 
year immediately prior to the termination date of such agreement. 
Thereafter, such a petition may be filed until a new agreement is 
executed." 
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determining the challenge periods for petitions affecting CSEA's 
existing unit. 
CSEA argues that the Director's decision is correct on any 
reading of the Act, Rules or case law and must be affirmed to 
promote the policies of the Act. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
Director's decision. 
As was made clear in both Kenmore-Tonawanda and Orange, the 
purpose of §208.2 of the Act and our implementing Rules is to 
ensure that employees have a chance at least once every three 
years to reassess their choice of bargaining agent, but not 
necessarily more often. The PBA's argument that the term of a 
contract in excess of three years' prospective duration must be 
treated as a nullity for purposes of fixing challenge periods is 
exactly the same argument rejected in 1979 in Kenmore-Tonawanda. 
In that case, a union argued that a contract covering 1974-80 had 
to be deemed to have expired on June 30, 1977, such that a 
petition filed any time on and after November 1, 1977 was timely 
under §201.3(e) of our Rules. In rejecting that argument, the 
Board concluded that the policies of the Act were served by 
treating the six-year contract as two, three-year agreements 
producing two window periods for filing representation petitions 
during the life of that agreement. 
The decision in Kenmore-Tonawanda was specifically 
reaffirmed in Orange in 1994. In Orange, it was again argued 
that a six-year contract covering 1990-95 had to be deemed to 
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have expired on December 31, 1992, allowing a petition to be 
filed 120 days after that deemed expiration date pursuant to 
§201.3(e) of the Rules. In again rejecting that argument and in 
reaffirming Kenmore-Tonawanda, the Board concluded that Kenmore-
Tonawanda 
reasonably balances the Act's purposes to promote 
stability in labor relations and the employees' right 
to periodically reassess their selection of a 
bargaining agent.-7 
Nothing in this case warrants any result different from that in 
Orange and Kenmore-Tonawanda. 
Finding this petition untimely does not result, as the PBA 
claims, in CSEA having unchallenged representation status for a 
period "well in excess of three years". CSEA's preceding 
contract expired December 31, 1993. From May 1994 until its new 
agreement was reached with the County in November 1994, CSEA was 
continuously open to challenge pursuant to §201.3(e) of the 
Rules. CSEA was similarly open to challenge in May 1996 and it 
will be again open to challenge in May 1998 pursuant to §201.3(d) 
of the Rules. None of these dates affords CSEA an insulated 
period of more than three years' duration. 
The PBA argues that CSEA should be open to challenge in May 
1997 because the employees missed prior filing periods in 1994 
and 1996 as they had not decided to pursue representation through 
a different union until after May 1996. The possibility that 
filing periods will be closed before employees decide to exercise 
^27 PERB ^3068, at 3157. 
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statutory rights, however, is always present in the very concept 
of defined and limited challenge periods. As CSEA argues, 
representation filing periods cannot and should not be created 
and defined by the degree or extent to which employees have 
chosen to try to unionize through other than their incumbent 
bargaining agent if the policies of the Act favoring labor 
relations stability are to have any meaning. 
Kenmore-Tonawanda and Orange are entirely consistent with a 
literal reading of both the Act and the Rules, which are silent 
in relevant respect to the calculation of filing periods once a 
contract has been deemed to have expired. Deeming a contract of 
more than three years duration to be expired after three years, 
such that a petition filed in the eighth month preceding that 
deemed expiration date is timely, provides no answer to the 
question of how the balance of the valid contractual term is to 
be treated for purposes of determining representation filing 
periods. Indeed, if anything, as the CSEA/County agreement 
expires with the County's fiscal year, a literal reading of 
§201.3(e) of our Rules would run the filing period established by 
that Rule from the actual expiration date of the parties' 
agreement, not a deemed expiration date. 
Finally, we find unpersuasive the PBA's suggestion that this 
petition should be held timely because these particular 
employees, and all employees generally, would have difficulty 
ascertaining the filing periods under Orange and Kenmore-
Tonawanda . Those cases are not difficult to understand. 
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Moreover, as these particular employees7 interest in 
representation by the PBA did not arise until after May 1996, the 
employees7 failure, if any, to learn that May 1997 was not an 
open period for representation petitions affecting the existing 
unit is not material. The filing in May 1997 was untimely. That 
these employees may not have known that the petition was untimely 
when it was filed does not present a reason to extend to them 
filing rights which they do not have at the current time. 
For the reasons set forth above, the PBA exceptions are 
denied and the Director7s decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed as untimely filed. 
) 
DATED: November 4, 1997 
Albany, New York 
m J ^ JUL \ i\<a J u. 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Mafrc A. Abbott, Member 
j 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, APL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17316 
TOWN OP PENFIELD, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ Of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
HARRIS BEACH & WILCOX (JAMES A. SPITZ, JR. of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of 
Penfield (Town) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) on a charge filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). The ALJ 
found that the Town had violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the 
Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act)-17 when it 
unilaterally retaliated against Patricia Marini for the exercise 
of rights protected by the Act. 
Specifically, the ALJ found that the Town had improperly 
issued a counselling memorandum to Marini for failing to advise 
the Town in a timely fashion of her attendance at a PERB 
-
xAn allegation that the Town also violated §209-a.l(b) of the 
Act was dismissed by the ALJ as no facts were pleaded or 
established to support that violation. No exceptions have been 
taken to that part of the ALJ's decision, and it is, therefore, 
not before us. 
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representation hearing, had issued a counselling memorandum to 
her for receiving a telephone call at the workplace from CSEA 
when the telephone call, in fact, came from a PERB employee, and 
had given her an unsatisfactory performance evaluation based 
largely on the first counselling memorandum. The ALJ determined 
that all of the Town's actions against Marini were in retaliation 
for her attendance at a PERB representation hearing during which 
she assisted CSEA's attorney in the presentation of CSEA's case. 
The Town argues in its exceptions that the ALJ was not an 
impartial and disinterested trier of fact,-7 the ALJ incorrectly 
allowed CSEA to amend the original improper practice charge, the 
ALJ improperly allowed a witness to testify to the prejudice of 
the Town in violation of the AU's sequestration order, and the 
ALJ's decision is not supported by the record. CSEA supports the 
ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and the arguments of the 
parties, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
In May 1995, CSEA filed a petition seeking to represent a 
unit of unrepresented white-collar employees of the Town.^ A 
hearing on the appropriateness of the unit sought by CSEA was 
-''Prior to the first day of hearing in this case, the Town filed 
a motion pursuant to §204.7(h)(1) of PERB's Rules of Procedure 
seeking that the ALJ recuse herself from further participating in 
the proceedings. The ALJ denied the motion and the Town appealed 
her ruling. We denied the Town's motion for an interlocutory 
appeal. (29 PERB [^3028 (1996)). 
^Town of Penfield, 29 PERB ^4007 (1996). The petition was 
subsequently dismissed after an election where the majority of 
ballots cast was against representation. (29 PERB [^3032 (1996)). 
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scheduled for Monday, October 30, 1995. Marini, an 
administrative assistant in the Town's Building and Planning 
Services Department, had apparently been active in CSEA's efforts 
to organize the Town employees. She had been advised by Miguel 
Ortiz, CSEA's attorney, sometime during the week prior to the 
scheduled date for the hearing, that he might need her at the 
scheduled hearing, to take place on Monday at PERB's Buffalo 
offices. On Friday, October 27, 1995, Marini received a Federal 
Express package from Ortiz at the Town offices around 10:00 a.m. 
Having been counselled previously by her supervisor, James 
Costello, that no union business was to be conducted during 
working hours, she put the Federal Express envelope into her bag 
and did not open it until she arrived home after leaving the Town 
offices at 4:00 p.m. Marini returned to the Town offices, 
arriving at 4:50 p.m. She photocopied the nonjudicial subpoena 
she had found when she opened the Federal Express envelope, then 
left a copy of the subpoena in the mailbox of Rose Iascone, the 
Town budget and personnel officer, and another copy in the 
mailbox of Douglas Fox, the Deputy Director of the Building and 
Planning Services Department. She did not leave a copy for 
Costello, the Director of the Building and Planning Services 
Department, because he was not in that day and she knew that he 
would be absent on Monday to attend the PERB hearing. Marini saw 
Costello and Town Supervisor Channing Philbrick that evening at a 
social event, but she did not tell either of them that she would 
be absent from work on Monday. 
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On Monday, October 30, Marini went to the Town offices 
around 7:15 a.m. to make coffee, pick up some paper work and make 
sure her supervisors knew she would be absent. While there, she 
saw both lascone and Philbrick and told them she would be taking 
a personal day to go to the PERB hearing, which she had been 
subpoenaed to attend. Philbrick commented that she should have 
notified the Town earlier. 
Marini assisted Ortiz at the October 30 hearing, although 
she did not testify until the second day of hearing held on 
November 13, 1995. Philbrick, Costello and lascone were present 
at the October 3 0 hearing on behalf of the Town. 
On October 31, Marini was called into a meeting with 
Philbrick and Costello. Marini told them that she had received a 
Federal Express package from Ortiz on October 27, but had not 
opened it until she arrived home because of the Town's 
proscription against engaging in personal business during work 
hours. Although she told them she had returned to the Town 
offices on October 27 and left copies of the subpoena for lascone 
and Fox, Philbrick told her that she had used poor judgment in 
failing to notify the Town earlier and that she would not be paid 
for the previous day spent at the hearing. 
On November 6, 1995, Marini received a counselling 
memorandum from Philbrick chastising her for not notifying the 
Town of her anticipated absence on October 30 during the day on 
October 27, at the social occasion that evening or by voice mail. 
She was reminded that absences from work were to be communicated 
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to supervision on a timely basis and any further disregard of 
Town practices would not be tolerated and would lead to 
disciplinary action. A copy of the memorandum was then placed in 
Marini's personnel file. 
The Town's Employer Handbook, Section II-D & E, requires 
employees to notify supervision as early as possible in the case 
of absence. But testimony elicited at the hearing showed, and 
the ALJ so found, that the established Town practice was that 
employees who called on the day of an absence due to vacation or 
personal leave were neither interrogated about the reasons for 
the absence or when they first knew of the need to take time off, 
nor penalized for failure to notify the Town in advance. 
In preparation for the litigation of this charge, the Town 
solicited statements from other Town employees who claimed Marini 
knew early in the day on October 27 that she had been subpoenaed 
to testify on October 30. Robert Schwartz, Real Property 
Appraiser for the Town, stated, and so testified at the hearing 
in this matter, that Marini had commented to him at some time 
during the day on October 27 that she was going to the PERB 
hearing on October 30. Schwartz told Regina Kennedy, the 
Assistant Town Assessor, who told Michael Spiegel, the Town 
Assessor. Marini testified that she spoke to Schwartz as she 
left the Town offices at 4:00 p.m. on October 27, 1995= In 
response to his inquiry about where everyone was going on Monday, 
October 30, Marini told him they were going to the PERB hearing 
and that she might be going also. Neither Philbrick nor Costello 
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was aware of these statements on October 31, when they counselled 
Marini, or on November 6, when Philbrick issued the counselling 
memorandum to Marini. CSEA then filed the instant charge. 
On December 20, 1995, Marini received a call at work, 
forwarded to her by the switchboard operator. It was from the 
secretary at PERB's Buffalo offices, informing her that the 
conference in this improper practice case had been adjourned due 
to inclement weather. The operator asked Iascone, who was 
standing nearby when the call came through, who "CSEA" was and 
told her the call was for Marini. Iascone then informed 
Philbrick that Marini had received a call at work from CSEA. On 
December 22, 1995, Marini received a counselling memorandum from 
Costello referencing the telephone call, reminding her that she 
could not conduct personal business during work hours and 
advising her that any further violation of Town policy would 
result in disciplinary action.-7 Marini testified that she told 
Costello at the time he handed her the memorandum that the call 
was from PERB, not from CSEA. Deborah Rautenstrauch, the 
secretary in PERB's Buffalo office, testified that she placed a 
call to Marini on the morning of December 20, identified herself 
to the operator as being from PERB and referenced the call as 
involving the "Town of Penfield and CSEA11.-7 Neither Costello 
-'Philbrick, after he was told by Iascone about the telephone 
call, directed Costello to issue a counselling memorandum to 
Marini. Philbrick co-authored the memorandum. 
-
7Rautenstrauch was subpoenaed by CSEA to testify, with no 
objection from the Town. 
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nor Philbrick made any inquiry of Marini before Costello issued 
the memorandum.-7 The memorandum was placed in Marini's 
personnel file. CSEA thereafter amended the charge to include 
this incident. The record reflects that one other employee had, 
in the past, received a counselling memorandum for utilizing the 
Town telephones to receive personal calls. However, in that 
case, the memorandum was only issued after three or four warnings 
about the use of the Town's telephones had been given to the 
employee. Marini had not received any warnings about telephone 
usage until December 22, 1995, when she received the counselling 
memorandum. 
On December 22, 1995, Marini received her annual evaluation 
for 1994-1995. Costello prepared the evaluation, then made some 
changes desired by Philbrick during his review of the evaluation. 
Marini was rated as "needs improvement" by Costello and 
Philbrick, who testified that the negative comments on the 
evaluation referring to her use of poor judgment were related to 
her request for time off to attend the PERB hearing on October 
30, 1995. Her previous evaluations had been "satisfactory" or 
"above average". As a result of her "needs improvement" rating, 
Marini only received a cost of living increase. To receive a 
merit increase, an employee must receive at least a 
-'Costello testified that Bernard Winterman, the Town's labor 
relations representative, told him at some point that the call 
might have been from PERB and not CSEA. 
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"satisfactory" rating. CSEA timely amended the original charge 
to include this evaluation. 
The Town first argues that the ALT was not impartial or 
unbiased and should have recused herself from hearing this case. 
We earlier decided that all of these allegations of the Town,-7 
which included the ALT's suggestion as to a basis for settlement 
of the original charge; her raising an issue that had not at the 
time been raised by CSEA; her adjournment of the February 27 
hearing date to a date less than two weeks away when the Town had 
requested at least a two-week adjournment, coupled with her 
statement that no further adjournments would be granted; and her 
later adjournment of a scheduled hearing date due to inclement 
weather, did "not set forth any basis upon which it must be 
concluded either that a fair decision cannot be reached or that 
there is any per se basis presented for recusal."^7 We 
indicated, however, that our denial of the interlocutory appeal 
did not in any way prejudice the Town's right to file exceptions 
to the ALT's decision pursuant to §204.10 of the Rules. 
-''The Town argues for the first time in its exceptions that the 
ALJ should have disclosed on the record that Rautenstrauch is the 
secretary in PERB's Buffalo office, where the ALJ is assigned. 
As the Town makes this objection for the first time in its 
exceptions, we need not reach it. We do note, however, that 
Rautenstrauch was identified on the record as the secretary in 
the Buffalo office of PERB and that the representatives of the 
Town have had contact with both the ALJ and Rautenstrauch on many 
occasions in PERB's Buffalo office. It is, therefore, reasonable 
to conclude that further affirmative disclosure of 
Rautenstrauch's status was unnecessary as redundant of 
information already known. 
5/29 PERB 53028, at 3063-64 (1996). 
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The record provides no basis to sustain any of the Town's 
exceptions related to the ALJ's processing of this case or her 
conduct of the hearing. The Town's representatives at the pre-
hearing conference, the hearing and on the exceptions are all 
experienced labor relations professionals who have appeared 
before PERB on numerous occasions. They know, or should know, 
that one of the roles of the ALJ at or before the prehearing 
conference is to assist the parties in attempting to settle the 
case and to make suggestions as to possible settlements, without 
expressing an opinion about or deciding the merits of the case. 
Here, the ALJ merely related to the Town's representative the 
terms that might resolve the improper practice charge. When the 
Town rejected the ALJ's suggestion, the matter proceeded to 
hearing. In addition, our procedures for the scheduling of 
hearings require that the party requesting the adjournment 
ascertain the position of the other representatives and obtain 
possible dates for rescheduling. The Town's representative did 
neither when he requested a two-week adjournment of the 
originally scheduled hearing date. The ALJ, nonetheless, granted 
the Town's request, but had to set the adjourned date for the 
hearing based on her calendar and properly advised the Town that 
no further adjournments would be granted, given that the Town did 
not follow proper procedures. That the ALJ later, due to a snow 
storm, adjourned the hearing date evidences no impropriety on her 
part. 
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The Town next argues that the ALJ improperly allowed 
amendments to the original charge. This, too, is an unpersuasive 
argument, as is the Town's allegation that the ALJ improperly 
allowed Marini's rebuttal testimony in violation of her 
sequestration order. Both of CSEA's amendments were timely made 
and were in accordance with §204.1(d) of our Rules. That the ALJ 
pointed out that she had become aware of the Town's counselling 
memorandum relating to the alleged telephone call from CSEA to 
Marini at work and advised the parties that it would be an issue 
covered at the hearing, does not establish bias on the part of 
the ALJ.2/ 
Finally, CSEA requested at the outset of the hearing that 
all witnesses be sequestered. Each attorney was permitted to 
have one representative stay in the hearing room to provide 
information and assistance. Marini was the first witness to 
-
7This exception of the Town does raise some concerns, 
particularly as to the unknown and unexplained source of the 
ALJ's information about this allegation. However, the manner in 
which the ALJ received this information and her acceptance of 
this allegation as an amendment to the charge before CSEA had 
properly amended the charge and before the Town was given an 
opportunity to state its position, does not establish reversible 
error by the ALJ. While the ALJ should have awaited a timely 
amendment to the charge by CSEA before notifying the parties that 
this allegation would be part of the hearing in this case, there 
was no prejudice to the Town because it was allowed to amend its 
answer and to fully litigate this allegation at the hearing. Our 
finding in this regard notwithstanding, the undisputed record 
evidence fully supports a conclusion that the Town's conduct 
toward Marini was improperly motivated. It is highly unlikely, 
given the nature of the original charge, that a second 
counselling memo, relating to Marini's involvement in the charge, 
would not have become part of the charge by amendment regardless 
of the ALJ's comment. 
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testify and, as the CSEA representative chosen by Ortiz, she 
stayed throughout the subsequent questioning. At the close of 
the Town's case, Marini was called as a rebuttal witness by CSEA. 
The Town objects because Marini was allowed to hear all the 
testimony, assertedly in violation of the sequestration order. 
Marini, however, was exempted from the sequestration order, as 
was one of the Town's representatives. Therefore, the 
sequestration order was not violated by Marini's rebuttal 
testimony. Further, it is consistent with our practice that each 
party representative may have a resource person present, even if 
that individual may be called upon to testify thereafter. The 
Town's exceptions to the ALJ's conduct and processing of this 
charge are, therefore, denied. 
Turning to the Town's substantive exceptions that the ALJ's 
decision is not supported by the evidence, we find that these 
exceptions must, likewise, be denied. 
The ALJ found that all of the Town's actions against Marini 
stemmed from her appearance at the representation hearing. Such 
an appearance is protected by the Act and an employee can be 
subjected to discipline for appearing at a PERB proceeding 
pursuant to subpoena only if the employer acts in furtherance of 
legitimate management concerns.—7 The record shows that Marini 
^Deer Park Union Free Sch. Dist., 22 PERB 53014 (1989), conf'd. 
Deer Park Union Free Sch. Dist. v. PERB. 167 A.D.2d 398, 23 PERB 
57021 (2d Dep't 1990). 
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advised the Town that she would be appearing at the PERB 
representation hearing pursuant to subpoena at least by the 
morning of the day she would be absent. The record establishes 
that the Town subjected her to different treatment than other 
employees who have requested personal or vacation time by 
questioning her about the time frame in which her request was 
made, by counselling her for failing to notify it earlier and by 
denying her use of personal leave credit. There is no legitimate 
business concern articulated by the Town which justifies its 
investigation of Marini, the issuance of a counselling memorandum 
and the refusal to grant her the time off with pay. Following as 
it does her appearance at the PERB hearing and her assistance to 
CSEA at the hearing, the ALJ correctly determined that the Town 
treated Marini disparately because she was actively aiding the 
employees' representation efforts. 
The counselling memorandum issued to Marini for receiving 
the alleged telephone call from CSEA also represents a divergence 
from the Town's practice. The only counselling memorandum the 
Town had previously issued for utilizing Town telephones for 
personal business followed three or four warnings to an employee. 
Here, the Town issued a counselling memorandum to Marini after 
only one instance of telephone use, a much more drastic action 
than it had previously taken with any other employee. Moreover, 
the Town did not investigate the circumstances of the call even 
after it suspected the call was not from CSEA, and it did not 
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retract the memorandum from Marini's file even after it knew the 
telephone call had not been made by CSEA. We, therefore, find 
that the Town did not act out of any legitimate managerial 
interest but out of anti-union animus when it once again treated 
Marini disparately. 
Finally, both Costello and Philbrick testified that Marini's 
negative evaluation was not based on the quality or quantity of 
her work but primarily on the circumstances which were set forth 
in the November 6, 1995 counselling memorandum. As we have found 
that the issuance of that memorandum was improper, the Town's 
reliance on it for Marini's rating as "needs improvement" and her 
loss of a merit increase for 1994-1995 are likewise improper. 
Without that negative aspect of the evaluation, Marini would have 
received at least a satisfactory evaluation, which would have 
entitled her to the merit increase. 
Marini exercised protected rights by supporting CSEA, the 
Town was aware of her involvement with CSEA, specifically her 
attendance at the October 30, 1995 hearing, and the Town's 
actions against Marini were taken due to the exercise of rights 
protected by the Act. We find, therefore, that the Town has 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act. 
The exceptions of the Town are, therefore, denied and the 
ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
Board - U-17316 -14 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that the Town: 
1. Rescind its November 6 and December 21, 1995 
counselling memoranda to Patricia Marini and remove 
copies of those memoranda from her file. 
2. Rescind the December 22, 1995 evaluation of 
Patricia Marini and remove copies of it from her 
file. 
3. Make Patricia Marini whole for lost wages and 
benefits, if any, with interest at the currently-
prevailing maximum legal rate, resulting from the 
Town's denial of pay for October 30, 1995, and for 
any salary lost as a result of the December 22, 
1995 annual evaluation. 
4. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
normally used to communicate with Town employees. 
DATED: November 4, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Xk ^£dJL 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO that the Town of Penfield will: 
1. Rescind its November 6 and December 21, 1995 counselling memoranda to Patricia Marini 
and remove copies of those memoranda from her file. 
2. Rescind the December 22,1995 evaluation of Patricia Marini and remove copies of it from her 
file. 
3. Make Patricia Marini whole for lost wages and benefits, if any, with interest at the currently 
prevailing maximum legal rate, resulting from the Town's denial of pay for October 30,1995, 
and for any salary lost as a result of the December 22,1995 annual evaluation. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
TOWN OF PENFIELD 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
WESTCHESTER COUNTY LOCAL 860, 
WESTCHESTER COUNTY UNIT 9200, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NOS. U-17309 
& U-17367 
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ Of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
MICHAEL WITTENBERG, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Westchester County Local 860, Westchester County Unit 9200 (CSEA) 
to two decisions of the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director). The Director conditionally 
dismissed CSEA's charge in U-17309 that the County of Westchester 
(County) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally contracting with a private 
contractor to provide food services at the Westchester County 
Correctional Facility. The Director also conditionally dismissed 
CSEA'"s charge in U-17367 that the County violated §209-a.l(a) and 
(d) of the Act by unilaterally subcontracting the operation of 
the Woodfield Cottage Secure Detention Program (Woodfield 
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Cottage) to a private company. CSEA alleges in both charges that 
the work had been exclusively performed by employees in its unit. 
The County raised several affirmative defenses to the charges, 
including jurisdiction and waiver. 
The Director determined that PERB had jurisdiction over the 
charges under the Board's decision in City of Saratoga Springs-7 
(hereafter Saratoga). He conditionally dismissed the charges, 
however, because a clause in the County-CSEA collective 
bargaining agreement was a reasonably arguable source of right to 
CSEA with respect to the actions at issue under the charges.^ 
The decisions deferring consideration of the merits of the 
charges were made subject to a motion to reopen should the County 
object to arbitrability of the grievance or should the 
arbitrator's award not satisfy the criteria set forth in New York 
City Transit Authority (Bordansky) ,-7 
CSEA excepts to the Director's decisions, arguing that PERB 
has jurisdiction and that the contractual language relied upon by 
the Director does not evidence a waiver by CSEA of its right to 
negotiate the contracting out of the Correctional Facility's food 
service and the operation of Woodfield Cottage. CSEA further 
^18 PERB f3009 (1985). 
-
7The Director dismissed the allegation that the County had 
violated §209-a.l(a) of the Act raised by CSEA in Case No. 
U-17367 as being derivative of the alleged §209-a.l(d) violation. 
No exceptions have been filed as to that part of the Director's 
decision and it is, accordingly, not before us. 
^4 PERB 13031 (1971). 
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argues that a merits deferral is inappropriate because 
Article 16, Section 3 of the collective bargaining agreement is 
not a reasonably arguable source of right to it with respect to 
the subcontracting of exclusive unit work. The County has not 
filed a response to the exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of 
CSEA's arguments, we affirm the decisions of the Director. 
The parties' 1993-1995 collective bargaining agreement, 
Article 16, Section 3, provides: 
Rates of pay, hours of work, and conditions of 
employment in effect prior to the Agreement and not 
covered by the agreement shall not be reduced without 
good cause during the term of the Agreement. "Good 
Cause" may be determined through the grievance 
procedure herein, including step 4.-7 
This clause has been in the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement since the early 1970's. The Director determined that 
the charges were within PERB's jurisdiction based on the Board's 
decision in Saratoga, wherein it was held that a general past 
practice clause in a current contract does not divest the agency 
of jurisdiction. The Board held also in Saratoga., however, that 
the charge was appropriately deferred on the merits. Pursuant to 
our decision in Saratoga and our more recent decision in Town of 
Carrnel-7, the Director decided that the charges were 
appropriately deferred on the merits to the parties' contractual 
-'Step 4 is the final stage, which results in binding 
arbitration. 
^29 PERB f3073 (1996). 
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grievance procedure because a disposition of the charges required 
an interpretation of the parties' collective bargaining agreement 
and a grievance might be dispositive of the underlying disputes. 
Here, CSEA alleges that it has exclusively performed food 
service work at the County Correctional Facility and has 
exclusively performed the in issue work at Woodfield Cottage. 
The language of Article 16, Section 3 covers conditions of 
employment not otherwise specifically covered by the contract. 
The transfer of exclusive bargaining unit work is, at least 
arguably, a condition of employment. The definition of unit work 
is not covered elsewhere in the agreement and the alleged 
transfer of the work claimed by CSEA occurred during the term of 
the contract. As we held in Town of Carmel: 
When ... disposition of a refusal to bargain charge 
necessitates an interpretation of an agreement which is 
arguably a source of right to the charging party, and 
an award rendered under a binding arbitration procedure 
is potentially dispositive of the issues underlying the 
charge, we have been persuaded that the policies of the 
Act favoring an accommodation of the parties' dispute 
resolution procedures are again advanced by a 
conditional dismissal of the charge, even when the 
charging party union has elected not to invoke the 
grievance arbitration provisions of its contract.-'' 
Resolution of these charges necessarily requires an 
interpretation of Article 16, Section 3 of the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement, which is a reasonably arguable 
source of right to CSEA potentially dispositive of the underlying 
disputes. Therefore, the charges were appropriately deferred by 
5/29 PERB f3073, at 3175 (1996). 
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the Director to the parties7 contractual grievance procedure 
ending in binding arbitration without further consideration of 
any arguments regarding the meaning of the parties7 agreement.-7 
For the reasons set forth above, we dismiss CSEA7s 
exceptions and affirm the decisions of the Director. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED THAT the charges are conditionally 
dismissed, subject to a motion to reopen in accordance with our 
merits deferral policy. 
DATED: November 4, 1997 " 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson A Ufa/— 
/Marcf A. A b b o t t , Member 
Z / S t a t e of New York (Dep 7 t of T a x a t i o n and F i n a n c e ) , 30 PERB 
f3054 ( 1 9 9 7 ) . 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, 
LOCAL 1126, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4694 
TOWN OF WHITESTOWN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Communications Workers of 
America, Local 1126 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Working Foreman, Heavy Equipment Operator, 
Motor Equipment Operator and Laborer in the 
Highway Department. 
Excluded: Seasonal and all other employees. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, 
LOCAL 1126, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4694 
TOWN OF WHITESTOWN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Communications Workers of 
America, Local 1126 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Working Foreman, Heavy Equipment Operator, 
Motor Equipment Operator and Laborer in the 
Highway Department. 
Excluded: Seasonal and all other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Communications Workers of 
America, Local 1126. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 4, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. 'Kinsella, Chairperson 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
